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STREAMLINING CONVEYANCING PROCEDURE*

Paul E. Basye**

I
THE PROBLEM OF SIMPLIFICATION

A. The Need for Simplification
The need for simplifying-even streamlining-conveyancing procedure has been all too well recognized for decades, but until the present
decade relatively little progress toward a satisfactory system has been
achieved. We have continued to labor under the handicaps of an inherited system which has become more cumbersome with each passing
year. It is noteworthy, however, that several steps have been put into
operation within recent years which have proved extremely fruitful and
have, in certain limited areas, introduced thoroughgoing revisions in traditional practices. But in most states the far-reaching improvements
necessary to an efficient, simple and fully comprehensive conveyancing
system remain largely in the contemplafrve state. Such particular improvements as have been made and may be made are deserving of appropriate appreciation, but there is growing awareness of an urgency to
concentrate emphasis upon designing a larger plan which will bring
needed reforms and new techniques to all features of conveyancing
procedure. 1
Many thoughtful persons have believed that universal adoption of
,,_ This is the first part of a larger article written by Mr. Basye on conveyancing reform.
The second wilJ appear in the June issue of the Review-Ed.
,,_,. Assistant Professor of Law, Hastings College of Law, San Francisco; Member of Committee on Model Probate Code, Probate Division, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law, American Bar Association.-Ed.
1 Chaplin, "Record Title to Land," 6 HARV. L. REv. 302 (1893); McCormick, "Possible
Improvements in the Recording Acts," 31 W. VA. L. Q. 79 (1925); Hendricks, "Defects in
Titles to Real Estate and the Remedies," 20 MARQ. L. REv. 115 (1936); GAGE, LAND TITLE
AssURING AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1937); RusseJl and BrideweJl, "Systems of
Land Title Examination: An Appraisal," 14 J. OF LAND & PuB. UnL. EcoN. 133 (1938);
Fairchild, "Improvement in Recording and Indexing Methods for Real Property Instruments,"
28 GEORGETOWN L. J. 307 (1939); McDougal, "Title Registration and Land Law Reform:
A Reply," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 63 (1940); Aigler, "Clearance of Land Titles-A Statutory
Step," 44 MICH. L. REv. 45 (1945); Aigler, "Clearance of Land Titles-Statutory Steps,"
A. B. A. Proc., SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW 19 (1946); Record
Land Titles, Publication No. 155 of Research Department, Kansas Legislative Council (1948);
Report of Committee on Substantive Changes in Real Property Law, A. B. A. Proc., SECTION
OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRusT LAW 81 (1948).
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the Torrens system would furnish a solution to this problem. 2 For one
reason or another, however, the fondest hopes of the advocates of this
system have not been realized. After more than a quarter of a century,
it has not been widely utilized in this country. 3 It does not appear likely
that legislatures will be inclined to adopt such a system in the near
future. The present recording system is bogging down of its own weight
and the weight increases with each successive transfer. Inertia to change
grows more chronic with the continued following of customary patterns.
It is a matter of common knowledge that valuable chattels may be transferred from one person to another with comparative ease, whereas land
may be transferred only after a searching examination as to the vendor's
ownership and approval of his title. Very considerable time o_ften elapses
between the execution and consummation of a contract of sale. The
expense of clearing up defects is not always insignificant, and the burden
of unmarketable land is a cumulative deterrent to social progress. The
urgent need for a larger and more efficient conveyancing plan is not
disputed, and yet such a plan is not presently available. Still, transfers
of land with greater simp1icity, more speed and less expense are demanded.4 For the present there seems to be no solution except that of making
revisions within the framework of the existing system. The thesis of
this study is that considerable improvement is quite possible within this
framework and that enough can be accomplished to give virtually new
life to our conveyancing system.

B. Objectives of an Efficient Conveyancing System
In light of experience in transferring ownership of real property it
may be said that an efficient conveyancing system should have four
fundamental objectives: (1) it should enable the owner of land to make
2 Beale, ''Registration of Title to Land," 6 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1893); Reeves, "Prog•
ress in Land Title Transfers; the New Registration Law of New York," 8 CoL. L..REv. 438
(1908); Rood, ''Registration of Land Titles," 12 MicH. L. REv. 379 (1914); Patton, "The
Torrens System of Land Title Registration," 19 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1935); Fairchild and
Springer, "A Criticism of Professor Richard R. Powell's Book entitled Registration of Title
to Land in the State of New York," 24 ConN. L. Q. 557 (1939); McDougal and Brabner•
Smith, "Land Title Transfer: A Regression," 48 YALE L. J. 1125 (1939); McDougal, "Title
Registration and Land Law Reform: A Reply," 8 llNiv. Cm. L. REv. 63 (1940).
3 Nineteen states have enacted registration laws up to the present. Nebraska ,abolished
its system in 1943. In all states where adopted, it remains optional and has not been widely
used. See McCall, "The Torrens System-After Thirty-Five Years," 10 N. C. L. REv. 329
(1932); Russell and Bridewell, "Systems of Land Title Examination: An Appraisal," 14 J. OF
LAND & PuB. llTIL. EcoN. 133 (1938).
4 See references cited supra, note 1, particularly the report of the committee on substan•
tive changes in real property law as it appears in the proceedings of the section of real property, probate and trust law for 1948.
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prima facie proof of his title by reference to public records; (2) it should
carry within itself machinery to bar all old claims or interests and to do
so in such a way as to make the legal effect of the bar apparent fr<;>m the
record; (3) it should facilitate the correction of outstanding defects or
claims which are not real or substantial; and ( 4) it should declare and
define marketable title in such a way as to make it reasonably simple of
application and to eliminate the necessity of each purchaser's examining
a title back to its inception.
The recording system itself has certain purposes, namely, to provide
·a public record for deeds and other instruments affecting ownership of
real property, to give notice to all persons who may be in the pr9cess of
acquiring interests therein and to specify priorities as between conflicting interests. The conveyancing procedure utilizes the recording system, but it is also dependent for its operation upon other rules and
principles. As a consequence our consideration must extend beyond the
recording system to all other legal machinery which contributes to the
functioning of the whole conveyancing process.

C. Background of the Present System
The transfer of a single lot or parcel of land may require sev~ral
weeks or even months for completion. The practice has grown up in
most parts of this country for the vendor to furnish the prospective
buyer with an abstract containing copies, in full or in substance, of all
deeds and other documents recorded in the public records showing his
title. This has required services of an abstractor whose business it is to
prepare such abstracts from public records. In some communities, notably New England and some of the Atlantic states, an attorney makes
an examination and renders his opinion from a personal inspection of
public records. In other localities this is done by title companies which
perform this task and also issue a title insurance policy to each new purchaser. 5 Whatever method is followed, it is customary for the purchaser
to have the vendor's title examined and its marketability appraised, based
upon the legal effect of all the documents appearing on the public records concerning the land in question. This system works fairly well in
new communities, or even in old communities where transfers of a particular parcel of land may be relatively few. But with the passage of:
time abstracts of title tend to become voluminous. Between ·the time
5 PA'ITON, LAND TITLES, §24 (1938); Russell and Bridewell, "Systems of Land Title
Examination: An Appraisal," 14 J. of LAND & PuB. UnL. EcoN. 133 (1938).
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that a contract of sale is executed and a deed of conveyance is finally
made much time is consumed in the extended title search and appraisal
demanded for each successive transfer.
As ownership of land passes from one person to another it becomes
the burdensome task of each examiner to trace the title back to its origin
through the myriad of documents of title and pass judgment upon each
of them. Every lawyer who performs this arduous task of examining a
title can bear witness to numerous frailties or defects in the documents
scanned by his legal eye. What is the effect of these defects? Do they
make the title bad or doubtful? Have they been passed by examiners in
in the past? or overlooked by them? Will they be passed by other examiners in the future? vVhen these defects, some of them hoary with age,
are brought to the purchaser's attention, he may well ask why it is necessary to reconsider them if no question has been raised about them in
the past. Is there not an end somewhere of the need for repeated examinations? Is there not a point of time beyond which one need not
examine to determine the marketability of a title? Are these defects of
such a character that there may be an ultimate loss of property to the
purchaser? or that there may be litigation which cannot possibly be
successful? or merely that some future examiner may object to the title?
Even though litigation has little possibility of being successful, one hesitates to accept a title if there is likelihood of any such complication.
And one similarly dislikes to accept a title which may in any way be
questioned by some future examiner. These are all legitimate considerations and deserve close study.
The ultimate question which each examiner must answer is whether
the title is a marketable one. The oft-repeated statement that a marketable title is one free from all reasonable doubt has almost become an
invitation for courts to declare a title unmarketable if an examiner has
entertained any· doubt with respect to it. The digests are full of cases0
in which courts have refused specific performance of contracts for sale
of land when an examiner has entertained a mild doubt as to marketability because of some ancient, previously unnoticed or long forgotten
defect in the history of a title. If a defect is representative of or accompanied by an enforceable outstanding interest, the title which contains
it, regardless of all original intentions, is clearly unmarketable; but if
the defect gives rise to an unenforceable claim, the title ought not to
remain unmarketable indefinitely.
6

See DECENNIAL D1cEsTs, Vendor and Purchaser, Key Nos. 130, 308.
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Notwithstanding improved methods and technological advances in
every field of endeavor, errors and mistakes are likely to, and frequently
do, occur. Perfection has not been attained in any human activity; conveyancing is no exception. The large number of individuals who, with
varying backgrounds and degrees of competence, engage in real estate
transactions is one important factor contributing to this condition. The
present state of land records is partially responsible for the difficulties
and delays experienced in effecting transfers of land ownership. The
social interest in developing and improving land demands that such
hindrances as technical defects and outstanding interests of an unenforceable character be relegated to their proper places and exert an effect
proportionate only to their actual rather than their technical weight.

D. Obstacles to Simpli-fication
The aspects of the present system of conveyancing procedure which
need to be considered in the over-all task of simplification are several
First, the present negative method of appraising marketability makes
successful operation of the existing system a difficult matter. Second,
rules of evidence in some states are unnecessarily rigid and thereby
render proof of titles from public records unnecessarily difficult. Third,
existing legislation which has for its very purpose the elimination of
stale claims and correction of ancient defects is still inadequate to accomplish its purpose. Finally, our outdated concept of marketability requires that each examination of a title must cover its entire history,
however ancient. A survey of these obstacles will suggest certain corrective modifications and will indicate other more radical revisions of
method and procedure where larger reconstruction is required.

1. Appraisals of Marketability
To define marketable title in general terms is relatively easy; to apply
the definition to a particular title is often a highly technical and difficult
task. The appraisal of a title involves much more than a mechanical
application of legal standards to the group of instruments which comprise the title to a particular parcel of land. Legal standards are not
always susceptible of mathematical measurement. A fine sense of discernment is sometimes necessary to determine whether a particular instrument meets the minimum requirements for an effective transfer
of the interest which it purports to transfer. When an examiner passes
on the effectiveness of a conveyance, he must exercise a kind of judicial
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judgment as to its validity and sufficiency. To expect that all examiners would invariably be of the same opinion with respect to a given
title is to expect a perfection that does not obtain among human beings.
Each individual examiner owes a duty to his client to advise him
truly and conscientiously as to whether he believes the title under consideration is a marketable one. Many unmarketable titles will not be
subjected to attack, but they do not command the same premium on
resale that a marketable title does. An examiner, therefore, must base
· his opinion in part upon what a subsequent examiner may say. He
cannot justifiably ignore defects of which another might demand correction. Each appraisal of title tends to err on the side of caution and
conservatism, with the result that trivialities are overemphasized. No
examiner of reputation and professional pride likes to overlook or ignore
what another would not. He has also a natural desire that an established relatiqnship of confidence with his client should not be disrupted
at a future time. Thus the entire process tends to become dominated by
overabundant caution and ultrameticulous judgments. 7 "Unlike water,
all conveyancers seek the highest level," is the picturesque way one
writer describes this legal phenomenon governing the behavior of title
examiners.8
This sense of caution .which insists upon a correction of trivial defects and irregularities may be founded either upon a genuine uncertainty in the mind of the examiner as to whether a particular defect casts
a real cloud upon the title, or upon an honest doubt as to what a subsequent examiner may say with respect to the same defect. Most lawyers
experi.enced in real estate matt~rs know the requirements established by
local statutes and decisions. Nevertheless, an area of genuine uncertainty
may exist even here. Sometimes unreasonable demands for suits to
quiet title are made. Demands for title corrections and for suits to quiet
· title are far too frequent in the everyday transfer of real estate. Resulting delays and irksome redoing of what should have been done right
· in the first place cause the public to lose confidence in the sy~tem.
. Title examiners are not to be unduly criticized for their punctilious
observance of minutiae. The basic difficulty lies not altogether in different human reactions and appraisals· but partly in the mechanical operation of the system itself. Its very nature demands satisfaction of all
doubtful questions which appear in titles.
7 See Williams, "The Over Meticulous Title Examiner as a Nuisance to the Public and
to the Profession,'' 17 NEB. L. BuL. 98 (Proc. Neb. Bar Assn. 1938).
8 Richard B. Johnson, "Mechanics of Title Examination in Massachusetts," appearing
in CASNER AND LEAcH, CASES ON PROPERTY, rev. temp. ed., 215 (1948).
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2. Rules of Evidence to Prove Titles
Proof of one's title from local records implies existence of rules of
evidence authorizing recording of those documents which constitute
evidence of ownership, and use of that record as evidence in a judicial
proceeding.9 The success with which this end is achieved depends in
part upon the scope of local recording acts. Most recording acts regard
records of instruments affecting real property as primary evidence.
However, in a minority of jurisdictions certain land records are treated
as secondary evidence to be used only after accounting for a failure to
produce the original documents. In either event proof of titles is ordinarily possible from public records alone.10
Also the drawing of inferences from recitals in instruments has
always been regarded as legitimate everywhere. That a grantor in one
deed is the same person as the grantee of the same name in a previous
deed has never been questioned. 11 That a person described in an instrument as the spouse of the grantor is in fact that spouse is usually
taken for granted.12 But if the relationship of such person is not stated
in the instrument itself, may it be established by a separate affidavit or
other self-preserving document? The legislative policy of some st~tes
contemplates the execution, recording and use of affidavits to explain
apparent defects or discrepancies, to establish identities and to supply
original evidence of ownership.13 Yet in other states neither the recording nor the use of affidavits in evidence for these purposes is contemplated at all.1 4
If recitals in deeds and affidavits containing evidence not subject to
cross-examination are untrustworthy, their use in establishing titles ought
not to be authorized. The alternative in many instances is to make
actions to quiet title necessary. The experience in those states authorizing the use of recitals and affidavits for certain purposes in this connection has certainly not been such as to cause them to abandon their
system. Indeed this practice has gradually been spreading and expanding, which suggests that it is not to be regarded as preponderantly unreliable. There is a need to reconsider whether the processes of conveyancing can be legitimately aided by this means. Those states which do
9PA'ITON, LAND TITLEs, §31 (1938); MAUPIN,
3d ed., 796 (1921).
lOPA'ITON, LAND TITLES, §§19-24 (1938).
11 Id., §47 (1938).
12 Id., §21 (1938).
18 See discussion in part II B, infra.
14Id.

MARKETABLB

TITLE

to

REAL

EsTATE,
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not authorize the establishment of titles by means short of actions to
quiet title compel landowners to labor under unnecessarily heavy
difficulties.

3. Failures of Existing Legislation
Titles may be subject to outstanding claims which are genuine interests or to claims which are technical ones only. If they are genuine and
enforceable interests, they ought to be asserted within a reasonable
period of time. If they are apparent or technical interests only, they
deserve to be extinguished promptly and eradicated from the record.
Both situations call for legislative action. Historically two types of legislation have been used to improve marketability of land titles burdened
with outstanding claims.
Statutes of limitations are intended to perform the important function of quieting titles in property law, thereby barring old and unmeritorious claims. But, strangely, there is no device for registering a
title acquired by adverse possession or of recording the fact that an interest has been barred by the operation of a statute of limitations. Without
a suit to quiet title there is no method available for establishing the new
ownership or its freedom from old, unasserted interests. There is nothing in the record to show that the statute has operated in fact. Another
impediment to the full realization_ of the potential usefulness of most
statutes of limitations is that they do not operate against owners of future
_ interests or_ persons under disabilities. Nor is it usual for statutes of
limitations to bar the state or other governmental units or agencies.
Without the device of registration and with the exclusion of these not
insignificant classes from their operation, statutes of limitations do not
achieve their full potential usefulness as a tool to provide marketable
titles.15
Many outstanding interests which keep a title unmarketable are the
products of defective deeds, instruments or judicial proceedings.Often
they are trivial defects. The owners of these interests may or may not
be able to enforce them. Whether enforceable or unenforceable, they
represent potential lawsuits. In this Jight they render titles unmarketable. Here again statutes of limitations have not fulfilled their purpose
since they have not eradicated such interests from the record. Another
type of legislation-curative statutes-has been designed to accomplish
the equivalent result. Statutes of limitations purport to bar interests
after the passage of time, but curative statutes actually correct title dell:i

See discussion in part III B, infra (to appear in the June issue of the Review-Ed.).
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fects and may do so immediately. Curative legislation has been employed for at least a century and a half in this country, often with noteworthy effect, but for the most part it has been sporadic and not systematic, restrictive and not comprehensive. l\.1ost attempts made to enlarge
it have been somewhat of a patchwork. Existing curative legislation,
serviceable as it is, needs to be completely overhauled and made to
accomplish the task that it is capable of doing. 16

4. Concept of Marketability
Our present standards of marketability are largely a product of
custom whereby evaluations of marketability are made to depend upon
the actual or possible existence of outstanding interests in persons other
than the present record owner. The existence of these outstanding interests, in tum, is ordinarily ascertained from an examination of the
record back to some recognized root of title, frequently a patent from
the government. This covers a long stretch of time and it is a rare title
that does not contain several defects in the numerous deeds and other
instruments between its origin and the present time. In addition to
genuine, outstanding interests, each defect also means that some person
has an outstanding interest in the land, at least on paper.
The very possibility of the existence of outstanding interests requires
each purchaser to scan the record back to its origin and satisfy himself
with respect to such existence, either real or potential. This means an
examination by each purchaser of the history of a title for periods ranging from one to three centuries in some states. The chain is lengthened
with the passage of time and with each transfer. Little wonder our
procedure is bogging down, when our tests of marketability are tied to
statutes of limitations and the latter do not necessarily extinguish all
interests that are of ancient origin. A marketable title of record needs
to be made a matter based solely on what appears on the record with
respect to the land during some recent interval of time. Except for
recent legislation in a very few states marketability has not been so defined and declared.17

E. Possible Methods of Simpli-fication
Improvement in our conveyancing system can be made by nvo general methods: by adoption of real estate title standards and by adoption
10
17

See discussion in part IV C, infra (to appear in the June issue of the Review-Ed.).
See discussion in part V, infra (to appear in the June issue of the Review-Ed.).
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of comprehensive and systematic legislation. Both have been tried in
recent years and are being currently tested. Both appear to be successful
and give high promise of further progress. Both appear to be acceptable
to the legal profession, to title companies and to the public.
By the adoption of real estate title standards a bona fide attempt has
been made to give specific and definite content to the concept of marketable title as it applies to specific problems. By the adoption of comprehensive, systematic legislation, objectives are accomplished by (I) revising and improving rules of evidence to authorize the establishment
and proof of title by reference to recorded instruments and recitals in
them; (2) increasing the scope and application of statutes of limitations;
(3) adopting comprehensive and systematic legislation designed specifically to correct or validate defective deeds and other instruments; and
( 4) defining and declaring what constitutes "marketable title."

I. Real Estate Title Standards
An organized effort by those engaged in title work can go far in
assisting the process of establishing and promulgating recognized standards of appraisal to be applied by them. Organized sanction of standards
laid down in advance will secure uniformity in the appraisals of titles
and help to dispel some of tl1e fears that opinions of future examiners
will be at a variance with current opinions. Knowledge of the standards
which other examiners ,vill apply in the future will increase the confidence with which present opinions can be rendered. The resulting certainty with respect to ·situations commonly encountered will itself constitute an inestimable boon.
The Connecticut Bar Association undertook such a task in 1936. A
number of frequently recurring problems were submitted by the members of the Uniform Practice Committee of the Real Property Section
of the Connecticut Bar Association. After thorough study the Committee then prepared a statement of each problem accompanied by comments and citations of authorities. After circulation of this matter among
all members of the Real Property Section, recommendations ,,,ere prepared as to whether various situations should be treated as substantial
defects requiring correction or as formal irregularities which did not
affect the marketability of the title and could be ignored in any opinion
given as to the title. These proposed standards were submitted to the
entire Real Property Section of the Association in 1937 and again in
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1938. They received its approval and were adopted in 1938 after much
careful discussion and consideration.18
The important consequence of the adoption of these standards is
that they are being used consistently by title examiners in Connecticut
and are being accorded a respect corresponding to the force and effect
of law. 10 Some of them are in effect a restatement of statutes and case
law in Connecticut. Hope has been expressed that a statute may eventually be adopted compelling judicial notice of these standards. 20
This movement for adoption of title standards has spread. In 1939
the Committee on Standards of the Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law Section of the American Bar Association sponsored similar undertakings in other states.21 The Dodge County, Nebraska, Bar Association had formulated a set of standards in 1938 for use in the county.
Others were adopted in other counties in Nebraska. The Nebraska
State Bar Association then promulgated a first list of standards in 1939,
and the Committee of the Nebraska Bar Association charged with this
task has continued to add to them from time to time. 22 It was the hope
of that committee that these standards so formulated would "have high
persuasive value in instances where our Supreme Court may subsequently have occasion to rule upon similar questions." 23 This hope of
the committee has since been realized.in a case24 in which the Supreme
Court of Nebraska set aside its first opinion, granted a rehearing and
later reversed its earlier ruling to achieve the precise result indicated by
one of these title standards.
Similar action has followed elsewhere. Standards based upon local
law and experience in title matters have been adopted in Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. 25 In some of these
18 For a detailed statement of this movement in Connecticut see A.B.A. Proc., SECTION
OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAw 130 (1939); 12 CoNN. B.J. 100 (1938); 14
CoNN. B.J. 126 (1940).
to Report of Committee on Standards for Title Opinions, A.B.A. Proc., SECTION OF
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAw 130 at 132 (1939).
20 Id. at 132.
21 Id. at 130-131.
22 See Sidner, "History of Abstract Committee of Dodge County Bar Assn.," 17 NEB.
L. BuL. 104 (Proc. Neb. Bar Assn. 1938); "Nebraska Standards for Title Examination," 24
NEB. L. REV. 119-120 (1945).
23 "Nebaska Standards for Title Examination," 24 NEB. L. REv. 119 at 121 (1945).
24 Campagna v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 140 Neb. 572, 300 N.W. 894 (1941),
reversed on rehearing, 141 Neb. 429, 3 N.W. (2d) 750 (1942).
2 ~ Colorado Real Estate Standards, 19 RocKY MouNTAIN L. REv. 65 (1946); Connecticut Title Standards, reprinted in 12 CoNN. BAR J. 100 (1938) and 14 CoNN. BAR J.
126 (1940); Idaho Title Standards, 18 lDAHo B. AssN. J. 140 (1942); 19 id. 63 (1944);
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states the title standards have been revised or added to from time to time.
These are all healthy signs indicating a strong desire to deal intelligently
and effectively with the problem of sluggish land transfers. The social
and economic consequences are such as to make these efforts worthy of
the highest approbation and deserving of serious study and analysis
toward utilization generally.
Some question has been raised, because these title standards have
been adopted by bar associations or organizations and are merely recommended for use, that they do not have the force and effect of law.
While there is truth in this observation, nevertheless bar organizations
are witnessing wholehearted cooperation among lawyers who are engaged in examining titles and rendering opinions on them. Furthermore, these standards_ are the result of a new and thoughtful analysis of
problems which are commonly encountered but with respect to which
no general opinion prevails. The hope expressed by the Connecticut
Bar Association was realized in Nebraska in 1947 when the legislature
adopted the entire set of title standards26 previously adopted by the
Nebraska Bar Association and gave them the binding effect of law so that
they could be relied upon and could be followed with assurance by title
examiners. It is to be hoped that this will be the beginning of a movement that will spread generally:

2. Legislation
Legislation constitutes the other method for increasing the efficiency
of our conveyancing system. For the most part legislatures have not
considered the problems involved in a systematic manner, but have been
content to adopt statutes sporadically from time to time. More comprehensive and systematic legislation than that now existing is needed,
chieHy with respect to four types: rules of evidence, statutes of limitations, curative statutes and statutes defining and declaring what constitutes marketable title.
lliinois Title Standards, 31 lr.L. B. J. 128 (1942); Indiana Standards of Marketability, 20
Tom. L. REv. 307 (1945) (adopted locally only); Iowa Land Title Examination Standards
(1944); Kansas Title Standards, 20 KAN. Juv. COUNCIL BuL. 197 (1946); Minn. Standards
for Title Examinations; Title Standards of the Missouri Bar, 4 J. Mo. B. 40 (1948) (adopted
1948 as appears in 4 J. Mo. B. 162); Nebraska Title Examination Standards, 24 NEB. L.
REv. 119, 122 (1945); Oklahoma Title Examination Standards, 19 OKLA. BAR AssN. J. 223
(1948); South Dakota Standards for Title Examination, 16 S. D. BAR J. 108 (1947); Utah
Title Standards, 16 UTAH BAR BuL. (Special Number, Feb. 1946); 'Washington Standards
for Title Opinions, 17 WASH. L. REv. 236 (1942); Wisconsin Real Estate Title Standards,
Wis. STATE BAR BUL. (Supp. Feb. 1946).
26 Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §§76-601 et seq.
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a. Rules of Evidence. Sales of land are made on the basis of a good
record title. This means a title which may be readily proved entirely
from the local records. No purchaser expects to be called upon to make
proof of his title by other means. Each deed and each instrument comprising the chain of title must be so executed that it or the local record
of it will be admissible in evidence without other or supporting evidence.
Otherwise, the burden cast upon an owner of establishing his title would
prove to be insurmountable in an age when ownership of land can
change almost from day to day and one's immediate grantor may not
even be known to him. Rules of evidence must be capable of performing this function within reasonable limits.
Over and above the use of the local record of these basic muniments
of title the establishment of certain other facts is also a practical necessity. Dates of births, deaths and marriages, the marital status of grantors
and grantees, heirship, possession and numerous other facts_ may be
equally essential in making out a good title. These facts often do not
appear in the instruments constituting the primary chain of title. In
some instances it may be necessary to establish them by means of a formal
action or judicial proceeding. This may be both time-consuming and
expensive. Many states have long allowed the establishment of some
of these facts by a more simple expedient of an affidavit or by a recital
in a deed or other instrument. 27 To the extent that this constitutes a
trustworthy and reliable expedient, the molding of rules of evidence to
accomplish this objective needs to be encouraged and put into practice
on a broader scale.
b. Statutes of Limitation. Ever since the statute of limitations
adopted during the reign of Henry VII28 exceptions have have been
provided for persons under disabilities. Statutes in this country traditionally provide that the period of the statute does not run against persons under disability or that the period is extended for a designated
period after the disability ceases. In the past the social interest in affording protection to persons under disabilities has been deemed to be of
greater importance than that of quieting titles. Is this policy sound?
27 See discussion in part II B, infra.
28 4 Hen. 7, c. 24 (1487). This statute

provided that a fine should be binding 5 years
after being read and proclaimed, except that persons under disability could attack it within
five years after their disability was removed. The first general exception in English statutes
of limitations in favor of persons under disability was contained in 32 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1540)
which provided that persons under disability could assert their claims within six years after
their disability terminated. Similar exceptions appear in subsequent English statutes of lim•
itations.
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How often would minors, incompetents and other persons under disabilities be deprived of their property if this exception were cast from the
statute? Would not relatives and friends see that their interests are not
lost by inaction? Legal action is always possible through a guardian. If
an actual loss should occasionally occur, would it not be more than compensated for by the greatly imprbved security given to all land titles?
The Supreme Court of Kenhrcky answered this question in the affirmative and put it thus:
"The policy of our statute is to protect married women and infants generally against the statutory bar by lapse of time; yet this
must have a limit, else it works injustice to others, and disturbs the
repose and security of proprietors; hence, the legislative policy is to
quiet all title, notwitl1standing disabilities, after thirty years' adverse possession; or, in other words, permits disabilites to prevent
bar by lapse of time for only thirty years." 20
Several states have adopted legislative policy to this end. More than
a third of all the states have placed a maximum limit upon the period of
the statute. Additional protection has thus been afforded to persons
under disabilities, but an outside limit has been placed upon its duration.
In these states repose and certainty of titles occupy a higher place in the
scale of social values than does unlimited protection to the legally disabled. A well conceived evaluation of this policy has been stated by the
Supreme Court of Missouri.· It observed that such a statute
"may occasionally result in insane persons losing their real estate-such misfortunes also frequently happen to people who are
sane but through some mischance neglect their property. Liberal
provisions have been made for securing guardians to protect the
property of insane persons ... so that the danger of such insane persons losing their real estate through the statutes of limitations is not
very great."
The court then noted that it is "a matter of public interest that the titles
to real estate shall, so far as practicable, .be settled during the generation
when such titles become unsettled or clouded, rather than pass the mistakes or even the wrongs of one generation down to be visited upon
remote posterity or remote grantees."30
The other great class of interests unaffected by adverse possession is
that of future interests. General statutes of limitations do not ordinarily
29
30

Conner v. Downer, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 631 at 634 (1869).
Faris v. Moore, 256 Mo. 123 at 132, 165 S.W. 311 (1914).
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begin to run against future interests until such interests become possessory. The reason for this is that the owner of a future interest has no
present right to possession and consequently no right to maintain an
action for possession. The purport of such statutes is to bar the remedy
only after the expiration of the statutory period following the accrual of
a right of action. This exclusion of owners of future interests also accounts for the failure of statutes of limitations to confer a marketable
title which can be accepted by a purchaser. Laches and estoppel have
been successfully applied in particular cases but neither is reliable for
appraising a title. As will be shown later, however, a few statutes of limitations have been made to apply to future interests as well as present
interests.
If statutes of limitations are to be made to effectuate their historic
function of quieting titles, why not bar all claims and interests after
thirty or forty years? In the vast majority of cases, interests older than
that do not deserve protection beyond that time. Persons under disabilities may still be granted a period of time additional to that allowed normal individuals without extending the statute beyond these generous
limits. If a minor or incompetent person has a genuine interest, his
guardian has a duty as well as a right to assert it. Owners of future
interests and nonpossessory interests should likewise be brought within
the pale of this absolute statute of limitations. This need not be done
summarily, however. If their interests have not matured within the
time allowed, permission may be granted them to preserve it by recording a notice of it. In this way prospective purchasers can observe all
claims and interests, whether present or future, possessory or nonpossessory, by examining the record of interests or claims recorded within the
statutory period.
c. Curative Statutes. Another kind of legislation which can be used
most effectively for clearing land titles of defects and rendering them
marketable is curative legislation. A curative statute may be described
brieHy as a form of retrospective legislation which reaches back into the
past to operate upon past events, acts or transactions in order to correct
errors and irregularities and so render valid and effective those attemped
acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose intended. 31
As applied to conveyances such statutes supply one or more ingredients
of a legal act which the parties intended to perform but ,vhich they
failed to accomplish completely or which "they executed imperfectly.
31

See discussion in part IV B, infra (to appear in the June issue of the Review-Ed.).
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In some states a great mass of curative statutes has been adopted and
many such statutes are adopted at each legislative session to cure or validate deeds and other instruments not previously included. In other states
curative legislation is almost nonexistent. This resort to periodic legislation to cure past transactions in which parties have done enough to
disclose their real intentions but have done it imperfectly has much to
recommend it as a means of promoting stability in land titles. The accomplishments of curative statutes in the past are many, and their potentialities for the future are considerable.
d. Statutes De-fining and Declaring Marketability. Time cures certain errors in conveyancing by means of statutes of limitations. The
healing effect of curative legislation removes other defects of conveyancing. But operation of these kinds of legislation neither defines nor
declares what constitutes a marketable title. The usual definition of a
marketable title is one which is free from all reasonable doubt. 32 This
negative approach is not too satisfactory, for it is a rare title concerning
which an examiner cannot entertain some doubt with respect to some
transaction in its history. As long as marketability is made to depend
upon the entire history of a title, we shall never achieve simplicity. We
must cut loose from the ancient past, extinguish all claims and interests
which grow out of or are dependent on ancient transactions, and make
marketability a product of the recent past. A sound workable definition of
marketability is one which states positively what constitutes that characteristic, not merely one that says what matters shall not constitute an impediment to it. ·
Statutes of the kind adopted in Michigan in I 945 and in Nebraska
and South Dakota in 1947 are models of this type of legislation.33 They
in effect declare that one who has an unbroken chain of title of record
to any interest in land for 40 years shall at the end of such period be
deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest, subject only
to such claims and defects of title as are not extinguished or barred by
other provisions of the statute or are contained in the chain of record
title during such 40-year period. All outsta~ding interests more than
40 years old are extinguished by the statute unless an appropriate notice
thereof is recorded, and a good record title for 40 years past is declared
to constitute a marketable one. No standard more simple or more easy
to apply can be imagined. The statute not only bars all old interests on
32 PATTON, LAND TITLES, §29 (1938).
33 For a discussion and citation of these

June issue of the Review-Ed.).

statutes see part V C, infra (to appear in the
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account of the lapse of time ( whether owned by a person under disability or whether the interest is a present or future interest), but bars all
such interests unless evidence of their existence is perpetuated on the
record so that subsequent purchasers and mortgagees may be given appropriate notice. Such legislation is the first long step toward bringing
about an efficient and effective system of conveyancing.
Thus our study brings us to a general view of the various means by
which the ultimate objective of simplification may be accomplished. It
remains to summarize and analyze what has already been achieved
toward this end and to point directions in which further improvement
seems most essential.

II
MARKETABLE TITLE AND STATUTES RELATING TO EVIDENCE THEREOF

A. Proof of Title
One who contemplates the purchase of land ordinarily contracts for
a good record title. This means a title which is marketable and "capable
of prima facie proof entirely from the local records." 34 Since the purchaser cannot, at a later date, always expect to find the former owners
ready and available to help him establish his title, if occasion to do so
should arise, he is entitled to have the evidence of that title made available so that he can establish his title without aid from his predecessors.35
The establishment of a marketable title from the record implies two
things: (1) the existence of a complete chain of title on the record commencing from some recognized root; and (2) a legal ability to make use
of that record as evidence in and of itself, without external aid, to prove
such title. 36 Thus all the deeds and other title documents comprising
the evidence of one's ownership must not only be properly recorded in
the public records but they must a1so have been properly executed and
acknowledged or proved so that they may be admissible in evidence
without other supporting evidence. An instrument, even though recorded, may be improperly executed or acknowledged and therefore inadmissible in evidence. A marketab]e title requires that each instrument
in the chain of title be so executed and acknowledged as to be entitled
to be introduced in evidence.
In earlier times an owner of land was put to it to prove the due
34 PA'ITON,

35Ibid.
SO Ibid.

LAND TITLES, §31 (1938).
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execution, acknowledgment and delivery of all the deeds and conveyances upon which his title was founded. 3 i This was a severe requirement
for it obliged the owner to secure numerous witnesses who could testify
from personal knowledge. But since witnesses died or left the jurisdiction, some substitute had to be devised for this method of proof. The
rule then developed as a matter of necessity that ancient documents
were self-proving under certain circumstances. The circumstances as
formulated by the English courts over an extended period of time were
that the document must be at least thirty years old at the time it is offered
in evidence, it musi: be in a natural custody, and it must.be unsuspicious
in appearance. 38 It was then admissible in evidence, and its due execution, acknowledgmentand delivery were presumed.
Statutes in nearly every state have given e:,...-pression in various forms
to this rule of evidence developed by t_he common law. 39 Most of them
require that the deed or other instrument sought to be offered in evidence shall have been, recoi;ded for a specified number of years at the
time it is offered in evidence. A few permit its admission in evidence
immediately upon recording, in which case the basis for its admissibility
may be that it has become a part of the.public records which are admissible because of the compelling need of convenience and their presumed
verity growing out of custody by an unbiased public official in accordance with this statutory duty. Upon either theory the document becomes
evidence without supporting proof of its execution and delivery, thus
bringing it within the power of any owner to make prima facie proof of
his title without satisfying the ancient burden of proving the due execution, acknowledgment and delivery of each previous conveyance in his
chain of title.
Although the doctrine of ancient documents has been extremely
helpful, it has not been adequate to establish proof of titles in all instances. One may need to prove his title before title deeds have become
ancient documents. This may be impossible if witnesses are not available. Most states now have statutes making the public records of or
certified copies of recorded deeds prima facie evidence of their due execution and delivery. 40 Such records are ordinarily available in every
37 Ballantine, "Title by Adverse Possession," 32 HARV, L.
38 7 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2137-2142 (1940).

REv. 135 at 136 (1918).

30 The statutes are too numerous to cite in full. See, e.g., Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit.
47, §107; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) §92.08; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) §§67-229, 67-230;
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§ 1840, 1850, 1875; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, Supp. 1948)
art. 3726.
40 PA'ITON, LAND Trn.Es, §6 (1938).
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county to be used in judicial proceedings. In this way an owner is
·assured of being able to make prima fade proof of his title if he should
be required to do so. Such statutes as these make duly recorded deeds
only presumptive evidence of their due execution and delivery. The
contrary may always be shown. But such presumptive proof is all that
may reasonably be expected for proof of a record title. Legislation has
thus furnished the means for owners to make proof of their title possible
from the public records.
Deeds executed and acknowledged according to earlier laws present
another problem. Any complete and satisfactory recording system would
fail in its purpose if it did not make the admissibility of deeds in evidence
depend directly and solely upon the sufficiency of proof of execution as
determined by the law applicable at the time of their execution. Such
has been declared to be true in the absence of any legislation on the subject.41 Nevertheless, in order to obviate any question in such cases and
to aid the problem of proof, a number of statutes have explicitly made
such deeds admissible in evidence although they would otherwise fall
short of the requirements for the self-proving of a modem deed. 42
Similarly, it has frequently happened that deeds executed and acknowledged in states or countries other than that where the land is
located have been executed or ackn,owledged in accordance with the
law of the jurisdiction where executed. Because of non-compliance with
the prevailing local statute, such instruments were inadmissible in evidence. To relieve from such errors, many states, doubtless prompted by
the frequent occurrence of such cases, have provided that instruments
entitled to be recorded may be offered in evidence and constitute an
effective conveyance for all purposes.43 In these states a deed executed
or acknowledged according to the law of the jurisdiction in which the
land is located or according to the law of the jurisdiction in which it is
executed or acknowledged is entitled to full recognition.
A somewhat different problem arises when a conveyance has been
executed and acknowledged at an earlier date, not in accordance with
41 Trustees of Canandarqua Academy v. McKechnie, 90 N.Y. 618 at 627 (1882).
42 The statutes are too numerous to cite in full. See, e.g., Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §71427; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) §§1205, 1206; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 40, §24;
Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §55-728; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) §67-231; Mich. Comp.
Laws (1948) §565.40; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §1840; N.Y. Real Prop. Law (McKinney,
1945) §293; Utah Code Ann. (1943) §78-3-9; Wis. Stat. (1947) §235.48.
43 Here also the statutes are too numerous to cite in full. See e.g., Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) §1189; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 40, U 10; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) §67-228;
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§565.9, 565.601; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §76-219; N.Y.
Real Prop. Law §299-a (McKinney's Consolidated Laws Ann. 1945); Ohio Gen. Code Ann.
(Page, 1938) §8516; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §70-114; Wis. Stat. (1947) §327.10.
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the requirements of law at the time of execution, but fully in accordance
with the requirements at the time it is sought to be used in evidence.
Statutes in a number of states have expressly made such a prior conveyance admissible in evidence in all respects as though executed according
to the requirements prevailing at the time of its execution aµd acknowledgment.44 While some of these statutes are couched in terms ·of evidence, they are, properly speaking, curative or validating statutes, and
most of them appropriately so declare themselves in their context. Their
real effect may be described as curing or validating a previous conveyance as though it had originally been properly executed and acknowledged.
.
The most numerous of these statutes consist of comparatively recent
pieces of legislation validating conveyances and other instruments executed and acknowledged by members of the armed forces before commissioned officers rather than before persons legally authorized to take
oaths or acknowledgments. For the most part such instruments were
executed under extreme circumstances and at places where persons authorized to take acknowledgments were not available. Commissioned
officers had been authorized to act in this capacity during \i\Torld War I
and a similar procedure was employed in World War II, but some acknowledgments were taken before legislation was passed in every state
to authorize this procedure. When such legislation was later enacted,
it related back to include conveyances and other instruments executed
prior to the effective date of the statute.
In proving title to a tract of land it is necessary to establish a chain
of title from some recognized source or root of title. 45 In most cases this
means tracing transactions back to a grant or patent from the United
States Government, or in some instances from other grants or other governments. There are now, however, a few statutes recognizing titles
under certain specified private grants. Statutes of this type are very
helpful in establishing sources or roots of title back of which proof of
title is not required. Of course, these statutes are effective chieHy as they
applv to grants or deeds covering tracts of substantial areas.
To a lesser extent similar statutes have been adopted to simplify title
procedure for small tracts and lots. For example, after a subdivision has
44 See e.g., Cal. Stat. (1947) c. IO, §2, noted in connection with Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, Supp. 1947) §1183.5; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, Supp. 1947) §56-B0(e); Iowa Code
(1946) §558.26; Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Hillyer, Supp. 1945) §1493.03; Wash. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1945) §10758-Ba; Wis. Stat. (1947) U329.11, 329.12.
45 Ballantine, ''Title by Adverse Possession," 32 HARV. L. REv. 135 at 137 (1918);
. PATrON, LAND, TITLES, §34 (1938).
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been platted for a certain length of time and the title of those who platted
it remains unquestio_ned, it may be possible to regard the title as valid
down to that point. An Iowa statute46 first passed in 1917 provides that
if lots or subdivisions have been conveyed from platted lands for which
formal plats were recorded prior to 1895 and which have been recorded
for twenty years or more, it shall be conclusively presumed that the
proprietors of the tract were the owners thereof at the time of recording
the plat and that the land embraced within the plat was free of all
encumbrances, unless an affidavit to the contrary was filed at the time
of the plat or unless other claimants commenced an action to establish
their rights within six months from the effective date of the statute. An
amendment to this statute47 in 1943 provides in effect that the ownership of the proprietors of a plat recorded prior to January 1, 1920, shall
not be contested after January 1, 1944, as to any right, title, interest,
lien, or condition existing at the time of the platting. A similar statute
was adopted in Kansas in 1945 applying to conveyances of lots out of
land platted prior to June 28, 1920.48 This type of statute eliminates
long searches into ancient records and requires owners of outstanding
interests to assert them promptly in order to assure their preservation.40
The benefits of such legislation are obvious.
·
It can fairly be said with respect to the means now prevailing for
proving land titles that they are reasonably adequate insofar as they
permit use in judicial proceedings of instruments which have been
recorded on public records pursuant to statutory authorization. Only
slight additional legislation is needed in a very few states to bring within
similar compass these instruments executed or acknowledged according
to earlier laws or according to the laws of the· state or country where
they were executed. The really compelling need for progress in this
connection is in establishing presumptions as to the validity of titles
down to some relatively recent point of time, or down to some notable
event, such as the plat, in order to obviate the necessity of re-examinations upon each successive transfer back to government patents or other
old recognized roots of title.
Iowa Code (1946) §592.3.
Iowa Acts (1943) c. 285.
48 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1947) §67-612.
40 This should be compared with the practice which exists in certain local communities
of limiting the title search from the time of the plat or from the period of that statute of
limitations which purports to bar all persons irrespective of disabilities. See PA'lTON, LAND
T1TLEs, §34 (1938); Ill. Title Standard No. 14 in 31 ILL. B. J. 129 (1942).
40
47
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B. Recitals as Evidence
The sum total of evidence of one's title is seldom confined to a chain
of deeds. There is usually a good measure of judicial and probate proceedings, foreclosures by power of sale, affidavits and recitals which
must be considered with respect to their competency and relevancy in
evaluating a particular title. It is a common practice in some but not alJ
states to recite certain facts in deeds and in addition to execute and
record affidavits for such purposes as identifying parties in a chain of
title, or establishing the parties' marital status, descent, heirship and
dates of birth, death or marriage, or, finally, stating the essential facts as
to possession of premises and explaining apparent discrepancies or defects. Statements appearing in conveyances in the chain of title itself
are usually made by a party to the conveyance. Affidavits are frequently
made by past or present owners in the chain of title who may be the
only ones having personal knowledge of the facts recited, although they
may be and often are made by anyone who is qualified to give testimony
on the subject.
On the basis of traditional principles of evidence, recitations in deeds
and affidavits would appear to be inadmissible in evidence to prove the
facts which are contained in them. A distinguished New Jersey judge
declared that such affidavits have "no semblance of juridical testimony." 00
Their hearsay character and thei lack of cross examination to which competent evidence is ordinarily -subject have disturbed many. 51 Despite
these seemingly valid objections, affidavits are commonly accepted in
some jurisdictions for the purpose of clearing defects in titles.52 Is thi~
simple expedient an unsound and dangerous one? Is it a questionable
practice resorted to in lieu of perfecting titles by means of suits to quiet
title or by other lengthy but more effective procedure? Or does this
procedure have something of a rational and trustworthy basis?
The admission of "ancient documents" without authentication has
already been discussed. Many courts, perhaps without fully rationalizing the basis for doing so, have likewise admitted recitals contained
0

50 Chief Justice Beasley in West Jersey Traction Co. v. Camden, 58 N.J.L. 362 at 364,
33 A. 966 (1896).
51 See, e.g., the opinion of Chancellor Zabriskie in Lane v. Schomp, 20 N.J. Eq. 82
(1869). For an article devoid of any faith in the reliability or competency of such affidavits,
see Lieberman, "Are Affidavits a Cure for Unmarketable Titles?" 2 N.J.L. Rev. 48 (1936).
52 PATrON, LAND TITLES §22 (1938). As indicative of increasing approval of the use
of affidavits see ill. Title Standards Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19 and 22 in 31 lLL. B. J. 128-130
(1942); Neb. Title Standards Nos. 13 and 31 in 24 N:sB. L. R:sv. 126 and 136 (1945).
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in ancient deeds as evidence of the truth of such recitals.53 Similarly,
affid.avits meeting the test of ancient documents have been admitted in
evidence to prove the facts which are stated in them. 54 The exception
made in favor of recitals in ancient deeds is not truly a part of the "an-cient document" rule. 56 The probable reliability of the statements and
the lack of other proof have doubtless influenced courts in engrafting
this additional rule on to the broader "ancient document" rule. In some
states, however, this corollary has been restricted to cases in which
possession of land has been taken under the deed containing the recital.
A Massachusetts statute provides that "a declaration of a deceased
person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay ... if the court
finds that it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge
of the declarant."56 Under this statute the death of the declarant is
sufficient to authorize the court to admit his statement if it appears to
be trustworthy. The exceptional value of this statute as an aid in clearing up defects in titles in Massachusetts by the use of affidavits has been
so well stated by a Boston lawyer as to merit a place in Professor Morgan's book, Law of Evidence. 57 The Model Code of Evidence would
go even further than the Massachusetts statute and make evidence of
a hearsay declaration admissible if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness or is present and subject to cross-examination.58 The death- of
the declarant would not be the only ground of unavailability; any inability to secure his testimony not due to the fault or procurement of the proponent of the evidence would suffice.50 Statutes elsewhere have
similarly authorized the use of affidavits after the death of the person
making it, after the expiration of a certain period of time after recording,
or sometimes even immediately after recording irrespective of the availability of the declarant. 60 Some statutes are clearly predicated on the
53See, e.g., Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117 U.S. 389, 6 S.Ct. 780 (1886); Wilson v. Snow,
228 U.S. 217, 33 S.Ct. 487 (1913); Garbarino v. Noce, 181 Cal. 125, 183 P. 532 (1919);
Rollins v. Atlantic City R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 64, 62 A. 929 (1906); Thompson v. Buchanan,
195 N.C. 155, 141 S.E. 580 (1928).
li4 Some of the statutes cited in note 39, supra, expressly so provide. On this subject
generaliy see Wickes, "Ancient Documents and Hearsay," 8 TEX. L. REV. 451 (1930).

Mid.
56 Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, Supp. 1948) c. 233, §65.
57 See letter quoted in MoRGAN ET AL, LAW OF EVIDENCE 47-48 (1927).
58 AM, LAW INsT., Model Code of Evidence, Rule 503.
59 Id., comment.
60 Ala. Code Ann. (Supp. 1947) tit. 47 §§116 and 117; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935)
c. 40, §112; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) c. 40, §117(1); Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) §92.08;
Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §55-816; Iowa Code (1946) §§558.8, 558.14, 649.7; Mass. Ann.
Laws (Michie, 1933) c. 183, §5A; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§565.451, 565.453; Minn.
Stat. Ann. (1945) §§507.29, 507.33; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §1851; Neb. Rev. Stat.
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"ancient document" rule, others upon the Massachusetts statute above
quoted, and still others upon the recording statutes which regard such
affidavits as an integral part of the record in the same way and to the
same extent as a deed.
Statements as to pedigree or family history, heirship and marital
status, 'together with dates of birth, marriage and death, have long constituted an exception to the hearsay rule. 61 This exception finds its basis
in necessity, convenience and the strong probability of an accurate reporting of facts. Testimony of this kind offered in any judicial proceeding by a witness would at least be subject to cross-examination.
But in the absence of a pending action even this evidence could not
ordinarily be preserved. Formal proceedings cannot be instituted to
perpetuate evidence of land titles each time an occasion might warrant
it. It is obvious, therefore, that statements of this kind, substantiated
only by the oath of the declarant, must be treated as admissible evidence,
or the simplification of conveyancing procedure must be regarded as
not feasible in this respect. Without doubt the use of recitals in deeds
and affidavits has some of the shortcomings and frailties to which human
nature is subject. It may also have certain dangers. But some dangers
are encountered even in the purchase of land with a perfect record title.
The use of affidavits and recitals in deeds is not a novel one in America.
It has been employed by custom or judicial sanction for more than a
century with reasonably satisfactory results. '\Vith increasing frequency
legislatures have seen fit to authorize officially the use of affidavits and
of recitals in deeds to accomplish a simplified title procedure. Statutes
in many states now authorize the recording of affidavits reciting certain
facts concerning land titles and the use of recitals in recorded affidavits
and deeds as prima facie evidence of the facts stated in them.
Affidavits sometimes contain statements of facts which do more than
explain an apparent title defect, such as one which would show title by
adverse possession. These have not been accorded the same receptive
welcome as those of pedigree or family history. It has sometimes been
stated that affidavits may be used to explain apparent defects in a chain
of title but that they cannot furnish the basis of a new title, as by showing a title by adverse possession. 02 Thus it is said that affidavit<; as to
Ann. (1943) §§76-271, 76-272, 76-273; (Cahill-Parsons 1946) N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §379;
S.D. Code (1939) §36.0204; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, Supp. 1948) §§8350.l to 8350.3;
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3597a; W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) §3952;
Wis. Stat. (1947) §§235.46, 327.19.
61 5 ·w1GMORE ON EvmENCE, 3d. ed., § 1480 (1940).
62 See PATTON, LANo TITLES, §22 (1938); 7 A.L.R. 1175.
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heirship are merely explanatory of a missing link in the chain of title as
it appears of record. At present the evidentiary value of affidavits as to
adverse possession is almost negligible. Courts have almost without
exception denied their admissibility in evidence. But in the process of
more frequently resorting to the use of affidavits to establish marketable
titles, there has been a growing feeling that affidavits of long, continuous, peaceful, adverse possession should be made admissible in connection with the clearance of other defects in order to show that the owner
of an outstanding interest has not made any claim at any time during
the adverse possession. It is only another step to allow direct proof of
title by affidavits of adverse possession. A very few statutes, chiefly of
recent origin, have taken this step and extended the scope of the evidentiary value of affidavits to include the fact of adverse possession. 63
Two title standards in Illinois frankly recognize the practice of using
them and their legitimate function to establish a marketable title predicated upon acquisition in this manner. 64
An owner in possession of land claiming under a chain of title of
an extended duration, with its origin in adverse possession, might well
be given more opportunity to establish marketability by this simple
means rather than be compelled to bring an action to quiet title. Of
course, the possible dangers incident to any such blanket promotion of
marketable titles calls for precautions, such as restricting application
to owners in possession who have an unbroken chain of title for an
appreciable length of time. Nevertheless, the extension of the functions
of affidavits to accomplish this end seems to be a legitimate means. The
limited recognition it is receiving at present affords a laboratory to demonstrate its value in a system of land title records that is currently in need
of simplification.
The problem becomes more involved, hovvever, when it touches the
matter of attempting to remove certain nonpossessory interests by means
of affidavits. Purchasers are not willing to accept a title with an outstanding mortgage, land contract, option, easement or oil and gas lease,
no matter what its age may be, without a release from the owner of such
outstanding interest. Negotiability, partial payments and extensions,
and partial performance render these interests too potent a threat to
marketable title to justify their removal as defects by means of an affi03 Ala. Code Ann. (Supp. 1947) tit. 47, §116; Idaho Code Ann. (1948) §55-816; Iowa
Code (1946) U448.15, 448.16, 614.22, 614.23 (adverse possession under tax titles and
ancient deeds); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §565.451; Wis. Stat. (1947) §235.46.
<H Ill. Title Standards Nos. 19, 22 in 31 lLL. B. J. 130 (1942).
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davit without other assurance or more substantial proof. While the lapse
of time may indicate a fair probability that foreclosure of a mortgage
or specific performance of a land contract is barred by limitations, titles
containing such outstanding interests are not usually regarded as marketable. 65 Their continued existence and ownership by one out of possession is entirely compatible with the owner's possession.
Recitals contained elsewhere deserve special treatment which cannot be detailed here. Worthy of individual study and analysis, from
the standpoint of their evidentiary values, are recitations, jurisdictional
and otherwise, in judgments and decrees, in sheriff's deeds under general executions, in judicial deeds, in deeds of foreclosure under mortgages and deeds of trust with power of sale and in corporation deeds to
show the authority of the persons executing them.
The value and importance of being able to recite facts in deeds, in
affidavits or in other records and proceedings and to make them a part
of the public records and available for future use is obvious. Since an
action cannot be commenced against all persons possibly concerned after
each transfer to establish one's title when there is no present controversy, some method of perpetuating pertinent and essential evidence is
highly desirable. That dangers and risks are involved in placing complete reliance upon recitals in deeds and affidavits is not to be denied.
They can, however, be minimized. Moreover, they are so far outweighed
by the advantages obtained from an authorization of their use that but
little argument would seem to oppose a legitimate extension of this
procedure. A measure of progress is seen in the very substantial number
of statutes which have made recitals admissible in evidence under varying circumstances. The enactment of further legislation for this purpose
is highly favored in states which are trying to simplify their conveyancing procedure and promote marketability of land titles. Although progress has been slow, the direction of legislation on this subject seems clear
and deserves encouragement.
(To be concluded.)
65 PATTON,

LAND TITLES pp. 941-944 (1938).

